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The Economic Price of Delaying 
Cooperation with the ITCY
Over the past 60 years, economics in our country was subordinated to politics. This means that
in pursuing a certain economic policy little heed was paid to the economic benefits and even less to
the economic costs. This specific manner of conducting a policy over such a long period of time
quite certainly left a deep trace on the present-day state leadershipÕs decision making, and the citi-
zensÕ perception of the kind of policy that needs to be pursued. A majority of the population is not
in favor of extraditing Slobodan Miloäevi to the Hague Tribunal, but rather for a court trial in the
country.
The citizens (and probably certain politicians as well, since they oppose the extradition despite
the WestÕs clear stands) are unaware of the fact that this policy of opposition has its price. For this
reason, it cannot hurt to make a simple calculation of the costs of delaying the extradition of
Miloäevi to The Hague. As far as the economic benefits are concerned, we are unable to detect
them. 
We are expecting a donorsÕ conference on assistance to Yugoslavia in May or June. The US State
Department will press for making assistance conditional on MiloäeviÕs extradition. The State
DepartmentÕs pressure is not so significant in the sense of the assistance that can be expected from
the US, since it will be modest compared to assistance from other states and institutions and sym-
bolic in relation to our developmental needs.  Its importance is in the powerful and positive signal
US aid to FRY would send to the broader movement of the worldÕs reopening to FRY, thereby con-
tributing to all the manifold benefits this opening will bring.  The absence of the US from this process
would send the opposite signal, and considerably slow the process of opening.
The economic price of MiloäeviÕs extradition to The Hague can be defined as the difference
between receiving donations according to plan at the middle of 2001 and the consequent strong ini-
FRY 2000 2000 III 2001 IIII 2001 III 2001 I-III2001
Basic Economic Indicators 1999 II 2001 III 2000 I-III2000
GDP growth in real 1994 pricesa É 8.4% É É É É
Industrial Production É 10.9% É 11.3% -3.9% -0.7%
Montenegro É 3.7% É 6.9% 8.0% 1.5%
Serbia É 11.4% É 11.6% -4.6% -0.8%
Central Serbia É 12.0% É 7.1% -10.2% -4.8%
Vojvodina É 10.1% É 21.6% 8.5% 8.9%
Average Wage - DM É É É É É
Serbia 93 -11.2% 142 4.3% 73.1% 73.2%
Unemployment Rateb ... É 28.8% É É É
Montenegro ... É 39.2% É É É
Serbia ... É 28.0% É É É
Current account, in USD millions -1,298 3.2% É É É É
Trade balance, in USD millions -1,989 -10.6% -177 -18.0% -18.0% 8.0%
Export - USD million 1,713 15.0% 188 48.0% 17.2% 13.6%
Montenegro 157 31.1% 13 21.1% -43.1% 3.4%
Serbia 1,411 13.8% 176 50.1% 27.1% 15.3%
Import - USD million 3,662 12.6% 366 6.1% -2.9% 10.5%
Montenegro 313 -1.0% 6 -13.6% -87.3% -62.8%
Serbia 3,035 15.6% 357 7.0% 8.0% 17.0%
Monetary supply (M1), end of period, in DIN billion 29.6 60.7% 34.8 10.6% 97.0% 84.7%
Cash 10.3 39.8% 11.3 8.3% 79.9% 68.6%
Deposits 19.3 74.9% 23.5 11.8% 106.4% 93.7%
Real money supply, end of period, in DM million 1,043 -26.7% 1,159 10.6% 72.5% 55.4%
Market interest rate, monthly level 5.84% 37.3% 5.09% -0.8% -3.4% 15.3%
Retail prices É 75.7% É 0.9% 112.2% 112.9%
Serbia É 70.0% É 0.9% 111.8% 112.3%
Cost of living É 85.6% É 2.1% 110.5% 111.0%
Serbia É 79.6% É 2.3% 111.2% 111.2%
Industrial prices É 106.5% É 3.4% 112.9% 124.4%
Serbia É 102.6% É 3.6% 114.3% 126.2%
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 25.45 103.2% 30.00 0.0% 33.7% 37.5%
a) Estimates based on information from the Federal Statistics Office.
b)  Unemployment rate refers to December.
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tiation of the economic cycle as of autumn on the one hand, and the receipt of donations at some
later date. Under the presumption that the package of assistance worth around one billion US dol-
lars is certain, that it is necessary for initiating economic recovery1, but that its realization is possible
in different periods, and that the economic recovery rate it would lead to can be estimated in dif-
ferent ways, we can obtain different values of the price for delaying MiloäeviÕs extradition. 
The main point in time
for calculation is the
donorsÕ conference in
June, and the beginning of
the economic cycle in
September (a three-month
deferral).2 The second
point in time is December
2001 (economic recovery
begins in March 2001),
and the third is June 2001
(September 2001). The
fourth option is that no
economic recovery is initi-
ated, which could also be
called the "conflict
option". It also implies the
additional cost of the drop
in the social product at an
annual rate of 3% after
2001. 
The value of the social
product which the calcula-
tions are based on is USD
10,500 million in 2001, and
it also represents the
achievable maximum in the following years unless radical reform moves are made. The possible eco-
nomic growth rates that would be achieved following the initial inflow of capital are 5% (the IMFÕs),
7% and 10%. Under the presumption that the growth rate is initiated at an annual rate of 5% in the
2001-2011 period, the cumulative difference between social product in the first and second options
is USD 3.5 billion, the first and third USD 6.8 billion and the first and fourth USD 51.4 billion. Under
the presumption that the growth rate is initiated at an annual rate of 7% in the period between 2001
and 2011, the cumulative difference between social product in the first and second options is USD
5.4 billion, the first and third USD 10.5 billion and the first and fourth USD 69 billion. Under the pre-
sumption of the growth
rate initiated at the annual
rate of 10% in the 2001-
2011 period, the cumula-
tive difference between
the social products in the
first and second options is
USD 9 billion, the first and
third USD 17.4 billion and
the first and fourth USD
99.88 billion.
If MiloäeviÕs extradi-
tion to The Hague
Tribunal is inevitable, then
it is very important how
much the delay of his
extradition will cost us. If,
however, "face saving" is
insisted on, the price will
be terrible, regardless of
which presumptions are
taken into account in the
calculations.
1 Just as the IMFÕs green light has a multiplicative effect on talks with other creditors, new credits from international financial
institutions and the inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI), the package of assistance for initiating reform processes can
also be viewed as a multiplier with an effect on the fresh inflow of foreign direct assistance, the improvement of the invest-
ment climate, etc. Therefore, a billion dollars is far from the amount of money necessary for economic recovery, but it can
be its prime mover. Also, the international communityÕs negative political reaction that would result in the postponement of
assistance could also produce a multiplicative negative effect on the postponement of talks on rescheduling and regulating
the foreign debt, the postponement of the already approved assistance (EU, World BankÉ), the creation of an uncertain cli-
mate for the inflow of FDI and so on.  
2 This option does not imply MiloäeviÕs extradition by June, but it rather means giving, by that time, the US, EU and the
Hague Tribunal firm guarantees that the extradition would take place.
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Economic and Social Aspects of Gross Wage
EconomistsÕViews
Years of stagnation in the 1980s and the sudden drop in the Yugoslav economyÕs activities starting
1991, with the maintenance of a relative level of the satisfaction of needs in the sector of public services
and entitlements in spheres of social insurance and welfare, were the pillars around which scientific and
professional debates were conducted among the economic public.
The course of developments and the increasing lack of funds for science gradually created a depen-
dence of a significant part of scientific economic studies on the needs of current politics. This resulted in
the appearance of two main streams of economists: (1) the first included those who endeavored to cre-
ate solutions regarding development and the economic policy that justified the destructive conduct of the
politicians of the time in relation to economic trends for the purpose of achieving personal interests, while
(2) the second comprised those who criticized the implementation of destructive mechanisms in manag-
ing the national economy and proposed solutions for emerging from the deep crisis that engulfed the
entire Yugoslav society and the economy in the 1990s. 
As regards the size of public expenditures, the former pointed to the necessity of reducing their rel-
ative share in the social product with the most frequent explanation being that the existing social and
state companies could not sustain the burden of taxes and contributions on employeesÕ wages. They
seemed to be uninterested in the reasons why it is precisely these companies that had found themselves
in the position to work with at an impermissibly low capacity, or why they needed to survive without
changing anything in their business strategy, ownership, or organizational structure. Also, less important
for them was the fact that the users of public services and beneficiaries of social entitlements were the
three most sensitive groups of Yugoslav citizens: (1) children and young people; (2) the elderly, the most
numerous being pensioners with small pensions; and (3) persons unable to work.
The second group of economists also had understanding for the high burdens imposed on inefficient
Yugoslav companies, but pointed out that their problem could not be resolved through the maintenance
of small wages for surplus labor and the non-payment of obligations towards the state and social securi-
ty funds. Rather, the better path was radical changes in the spheres of politics and economics, which
would result in a larger social product as the main precondition for resolving all these problems. This is
actually the only way to reduce the relative share of public expenditures in the social product in condi-
tions when personal income from these funds is very small compared to the reached high level of the
costs of living, as a result of economic inefficiency. However, this implies the restructuring of the exist-
ing inefficient companies in line with market principles of doing business.
First Attempt at Introducing Gross Wage 
The 1991 fiscal reform in Yugoslavia introduced the category of the gross wage, whereby 50% of the
contributions for social insurance were calculated at the expense of the employees, and 50% at the
expense of the employers. However, the introduction of the gross wage began at the time when the for-
mer state was disintegrating and the new one was entering a period of hyperinflation and the interna-
tional communityÕs sanctions. This largely hindered a change in the employeesÕ perception of the gross
wage, since the high costs of living imposed the need to worry about current spending which boiled
down to the satisfaction of the basic needs. It was difficult to think at the time about the point of paying
contributions for social insurance which, essentially, represented the employeesÕ savings for future needs.
Indeed, when the new manner of calculating salaries was introduced, employees were unprepared in the
sense that they were uninformed about the importance of the gross wage for the satisfaction of their
future needs. They were familiar only with the net wage in the previous system, when they were able to
use heath services without limit and to receive pensions after completing their years of service.
On the one hand, there was a considerable reduction of the social product and the salary fund. On
the other, rights were granted to the beneficiaries of social insurance and welfare that the state was oblig-
ed, under the law, to service. At the same time, the costs of living rose enormously. There appeared a
large discrepancy between the inflow of assets and the scope of expenditures that was to ensure the reg-
ular payout of pensions, health insurance allowances, unemployment allowances as well as social wel-
fare.
Destruction of Gross Wage
At the time of hyperinflation, a large part of the funds for servicing the entitlements of social insur-
ance and social welfare were ensured by printing money without backing. Employees received, on the
average, only around one third of their wage in money, while about two thirds were paid out in kind.1
The contributions for social insurance were calculated only on the basis of the part of the wage paid out
in money, which was actually the only statistically registered part of the wage.
This wage policy model completely derogated the significance of the gross wage. On the other hand,
the in-kind payment of a larger portion of wages excluded much of the wage base from taxation creat-
ing the following important problems: (1) the inflow of assets into the budgets and social insurance funds,
primarily of the pension and invalid insurance funds, was considerably reduced; (2) the real ratio between
the average wage and average pension was disrupted; (3) the base for achieving rights in the sphere of
social insurance was reduced; (4) belatedness in servicing the entitlements of the beneficiaries of social
insurance and social welfare; (5) introduction of other non-taxable or considerably less taxable forms of
employee wage, which were not registered in official statistics as part of the wage.
.
Role of Non-taxable Forms of Payments to Employees 
The application of the model of paying the employeesÕ wages in kind in the period of hyperinflation,
whose main goal was to preserve social peace, led to the further destruction of the gross wage upon the
halting of hyperinflation. The preservation of socially-owned companies which were left without work-
ing capital in the period of hyperinflation, represented an important aspect of the then regimeÕs struggle
for maintaining the existing situation. Among other things, surplus manpower, who kept being sent on
paid leave, was, in various manners and through different institutions of the system, still provided with a
guaranteed net wage at a symbolic level, or through some other forms of non-taxable and less taxable
income, such as: (1) company-paid meals; (2) holiday cash grants; (3) field allowances; (4) payment for
work through students and youth cooperative societies; (5) various types of goods (foodstuffs); (6) com-
modity credits from companies; (7) other forms of employment income (direct cash payments in well-off
companies and so on).
In this sense, it is necessary to point out that company-paid meals, holiday cash grants and field
allowances were not new categories of employeesÕ income, but they were now used as a model of financ-
ing and maintaining redundant labor in companies that were working at low capacity. Thus, companies
survived and workers remained employed on paper.
It is well known that not an insignificant number of companies and other legal entities failed to pay con-
tributions for social insurance over the past few years, with the exception of employees who had achieved
their right to a pension. In view of all this and the previously mentioned modalities of paying employees in
forms other than wages, it is clear that the problems with the financing of the entitlements of social insur-
ance beneficiaries became increasingly difficult. For this reason, the rates of the wage tax and contributions
for social insurance kept being increased, which made the problem of ensuring funds for wages even greater.
Therefore, at issue here are not temporary and accidental financial problems of companies, but rather
a constant lack of funds. Namely, the non-payment of taxes and contributions on employeesÕ salaries was
not in the function of investing in production, which would, in a way, be justified if such investments
were later to produce certain results, but rather the function of postponing the resolution of the compa-
niesÕ problems and maintaining the existing state of affairs.
On the other hand, this practice also spread to those com-
panies that were unable to settle regularly and in line with the
law their obligations towards the state and social insurance
funds. Analyses of the gray economy indicate that the state and
social insurance funds were deprived of considerable assets in
this manner.2 Deprived were, quite certainly, also the employees-
insurees, but they will pay the price for this much later, i.e. in
their old age, unless attention is paid to this in possible changes
of the existing system of pension and invalid insurance. It is pre-
sumed that employers personified by directors and individuals
from the companiesÕ managerial structures could have benefited
from the non-payment of taxes and contributions on wages
Dimensions of EmployeesÕ Income not Included in the
Wage 
According to the results of a public opinion poll on the labor force conducted by the Federal Bureau
of Statistics, the structure of the average employment income in the 1997-2000 period is very interesting,
since it reflected the dominant policy and distribution model in the mentioned period.
The table shows that among income not included in the wage the most important is so-called other
employment income, followed by commodity credits from companies, company-paid meals, trade union
assistance and other types of goods.
Compared to total average employment income in the observed period, on the average the wage
accounted for 87%-88%, company-paid meals for 19%-22%, trade union assistance for 18% (in 2000) —
33% (in 1999), various types of goods for 18%-24%, commodity credits from companies for 26% (in1999)
— 51% (in 2000) and other employment income for 44% (in 1998) — 86% (in 1999).
If the above-mentioned categories of average employment income are observed in relation to the
average wage, the reached conclusion is that the share of the company-paid meal per employee in the
average wage (also per employee) gradually decreased. Other income accounted for over 50% of the
average wage in the observed years, excluding 1999 when their share reached 98% of the average wage. 
Since these are the results of a public opinion poll, the size of other employment income is very
indicative. It seems that this category also includes the statistically unregistered and non-taxable income
of employees.
According to data of the Institute of Accounting and Payments on monetary income and allowances
to the population, over the past years, the share of the net wage in overall monetary income of employ-
ees in the Republic of Serbia was around 60%, and of other personal income around 40%.
The share of other personal income of employees in the fund of the paid out net wages (without sick
leave allowances) accounted for 62.83% in 1999, for 67.33% in 2000 and for 57.25% in the first three
months of 2001. 
In the structure of other personal income, the share of gross income from work through youth and
students corporate societies, company-paid meals and holiday cash grants accounts for around 50%.
If we exempt sick leave allowances, severance payments, field allowances, family separation
allowances and various welfare and student allowances, as well as transport allowances and retentions
from other personal income, there remains income (with the exception of the field allowance for which
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Type of income 1997 1998 1999 2000
TOTAL 1,101 1,371 1,669 2,913
Wages 958 1,201 1,469 2,539
Company-paid meal 245 284 330 558
Trade union assistance 225 314 543 529
Various types of goods 215 245 401 532
Commodity credits from companies 316 394 432 1,476
Other employment income 574 608 1,440 1,314
Source: Poll on the labor force, statements of the Federal Bureau of Statistics no. 023/1999 and  073/2000
Average employment income in the Republic of Serbia —
in dinars
there is no data) which, following amendments to the Law on
Labor Relations, will be included in the net wage — company-
paid meals and holiday cash grants, as well as net income from
work through student and youth corporate societies. The share
of this income in the net income fund (without sick leave
allowances) accounted for 27.92% in 1999, for 29.53% in 2000,
and for 28.44% in the first three months of 2001. The share of
the company-paid meal and holiday cash grant alone in the net
wage fund (without sick leave allowances) accounted for 20.32%
in 1999, for 20.93% in 2000 and for 23.84% in the first three
months of 2001.
Varying Impact of New Solutions for Gross Wage
Calculation 
The results of the previous analysis point to the conclusion
that, following the implementation of the solutions adopted
within the Law on Labor Relations, the net registered wage will
increase by around 20%, simply due to the improved methodol-
ogy. This will enable a reduction of the rates of the wage tax and
contributions for social insurance. Under the presumption that the same scope of taxes and contributions
is retained, the ratio between the net wage and total transfers resulting from taxes and contributions for
income, would be reduced from the present 1:1 or so, to around 1:0.67. In the event that a certain
increase in the supply of taxes and contributions is necessary, this ratio would be somewhat more unfa-
vorable, since the rate of the wage tax and contributions for social insurance would be reduced.
However, if one takes into account the results of the analysis of employment income and the poll on
the labor force, one comes to the conclusion that the increase in the average net wage could be much
higher if unregistered payments (direct cash payments) would be added and if payments in kind to
employees would be replaced by payments in money, i.e. if this income would be added to the net wage.
This could provide for a larger reduction of the wage tax rate and the collective rate of contributions for
social insurance.
In this regard, it is necessary to mention that the implementation of new solutions concerning the
scope of the net wage will lead to the statistical increase in net wage by the existing amount of the cat-
egories included in the net wage. For this reason, it is also necessary immediately to ensure a compara-
ble methodology of calculating the net wage for the previous period, so that its true increase could be
registered. Thus, avoided would be all the confusions concerning the legal adjustment of certain forms
of citizensÕ income, primarily pensions.
Why Two Net Wages? 
Unbelievable but true is the fact that two net wage categories are used in the Republic of SerbiaÕs reg-
istering system. The first represents the net wage defined by the Law on Labor Relations and it is pub-
lished within the statistical system. The second is calculated on the basis of certain Instructions and does
not contain the part of the income due during state holidays, annual vacations, paid leave, overtime work,
past labor, sick leave allowance and the like. This net wage serves as the basis for calculating social trans-
fers, childrenÕs allowances and so on.
The net wage calculated according to the Instructions was smaller than the legally defined net wage
by 16.4% in December 1995, by 23.4% in December 1996, by 23.4% in December 1997, by 23.8% in
December 1998, by 26.4% in December 1999, by 26% in December 2000 and by 26.7% in February 2001.
This clearly shows that the former regime in Serbia skillfully conceived instructions and methodolo-
gies that were detrimental to the most vulnerable categories of the population: children, people unable
to work and the poor. For this reason it is necessary for the responsible bodies immediately to abolish
the instructions for the calculation of the second net wage, i.e. the one serving as the basis of calculat-
ing social transfers.
Changes on the Right Road 
On the whole, it can be concluded that the present regime in Serbia has initiated very important
changes in the system and policy of distribution on the road towards the realization of the program of
comprehensive reforms. The introduction of the gross wage as a true category is a step towards the har-
monization of fiscal solutions with those in European Union countries. At the same time, this is also a
precondition for a relative reduction of fiscalities and the creation of conditions for the regular settlement
of the companiesÕ obligations towards the state and social insurance funds.
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Type of income 1999 2000 I-III 2001
TOTAL 100 100 100
Net wages 61.41 59.76 63.59
Other personal income 38.59 40.24 36.41
Various allowances3 16.88 16.05 13.39
Gross allowances for work through 
student and youth corporate societies 6.78 9.13 5.21
Company-paid meals 8.47 8.49 9.26
Holiday cash grants 4.01 4.02 5.9
Transport to and from work 2.38 2.48 2.61
Restitutes from Other personal income4 0.07 0.06 0.03
Source: Institute of Accounting and Payments
Structure of monetary income of employees in the
Republic of Serbia
1 Mirosinka Dinki, "Social welfare programme in support of the programme of monetary restructuring and the strategy of an
economic recovery of Yugoslavia," Industrija no.1,2 (1995), pp.97-116.  
2 "Analysis of the gray economy in FR Yugoslavia with estimates for 1997 and recommendations for its legalization,"
Economics Institute, Belgrade 1998.
1 Included: sick leave allowances, childrenÕs allowances, veteransÕ allowances, social welfare, disability allowances, scholar-
ships, allowances for the work of pupils and students, per diems and transport allowances for business trips, field
allowances, family separation allowances, severance payments.
2 Included: deducted membership fees, deductions resulting from credits from other  personal income and other deductions
from other personal income.
MACROECONOMIC REVIEW
The main goals of economic policy for 2001 are now fully known. The projected growth of the gross
social product is 5%, while the share of public expenditures is planned to be 44% of GDP with a 3%
deficit. The GDP expressed in dollars accounts to around 10 billion, and is considerably lower than the
previously used official data that were under the influence of the unrealistically high presentations of cer-
tain components. The planned growth rate of exports is projected to total 12% and of imports around
22%. Thus, this yearÕs trade deficit is to account for around USD 2.5 billion. The final planned inflation is
30%. The realization of these goals implies the creation of preconditions for sustainable development and
the beginning of the economyÕs reconstruction. 
Prices and Wages
The 0.9% retail price growth in March led to a temporary price stabilization, but the expected price
increase in April, caused by the correction of tax rates and the further elimination of price disparities
totaled to 9.3% in Serbia. The total retail price growth in April was mostly the result of an increase in the
prices of industrial products by 9.5% (the prices of industrial food products registered 10.3% growth, and
industrial non-food products were up 10.2%). The prices of agricultural products recorded an increase of
6.0%. In the previous issue we said that pro-
jections of the macroeconomic aggregates
were based on an annual inflation of 30%. A
large part of the expected inflationary effects
(13%) for April and May have already
become visible. In the first four months of
the year, the inflation rate measured by retail
prices in Serbia was 17.7%. A possible prob-
lem is the appearance of inflationary expec-
tations and price adjustment related to this.
Net wages (average) in Serbia in March
(4,262 din) compared to February 2001
increased nominally by 4.3%. Expressed in
German marks, wages in March were worth
142 DEM, which is 4.3% higher than in
February 2001. The real purchasing power of
the March wage (nominal wages deflated by
the consumer price index) was up by 2%.
The average wage (expressed in DEM) was
higher by 73.1% relative to the same month
last year. The average wage for the first three
months of this year compared to the same
period last year is up by 73.2%. Apart from
wages, an exceptional increase of 23.34% in the populationÕs monetary income was also registered in
March. The growth of aggregate demand based on this is not directed towards an increase in the dynam-
ics of production, since there is an outflow resulting from the increases in prices and taxes — the growth
of public revenues totaled 10.1%.
Output 
Industrial output in the FRY in March 2001 increased 11.3%, month-on-month. Output was up 6.9%
in Montenegro, and up 11.6% in Serbia. This marked considerable monthly growth, but industrial output
was 3.9% lower than in the same month of last year, under the effect of the same seasonal factors.
Relative to March of 2000, output grew by 8.0% in Montenegro, and in Serbia it fell by 4.6%. The drop in
output in Central Serbia was 10.2%, while
Vojvodina registered an 8.5% increase. The
deseasonalized index for March shows 1.6%
growth compared to February.
In Central Serbia, the deseasonalized
month-on-month output growth was 7.1%,
and in Vojvodina 21.6%. Output fell in 11
spheres — from 20.1% (production of cellu-
lose and paper, and paper processing) to
0.3% (manufacture of garments and fur),
while it increased in other sectors — from
235% (production of coke and oil deriva-
tives) to 1.0% (furniture manufacture).
In 18 sectors, output decreased in rela-
tion to the same month of the previous year
— from 47.1% (metal ore extraction) to 2.9%
(production of other machines and devices),
while other spheres registered a growth rang-
ing from 126.9% (production of coke and oil
derivatives) to 1.8% (manufacture of products
from other minerals). Industrial output in the
FRY in the January-March 2001 period was
down by 0.7% relative to the same period last
year. Montenegro registered a 1.5% increase,
and Serbia a 0.8% drop. In Central Serbia, output fell by 4.8%, and grew in Vojvodina by 8.9%. 
In the first quarter of 2001, output was down in 14 sectors — from 45.1% (metal ore extraction) to 4.3%
(production of precision and optical instruments), while it increased in the same number of sectors — from
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37.4% (production of coke and oil derivatives) to 2.7% (manufacture of other machines and devices). A
potential danger lies in the continuing delay to overhauling the electric power grid, due to which the pro-
jected output growth rates may have to be corrected.
A recovery of industrial production is not to be expected before the second half of the year. In con-
ditions of a pronounced lack of working capital, the insufficient use of capacities and accumulated loss-
es, production can begin its recovery only with the implementation of structural reforms. The first step in
these reforms were made in the form of stabilizing the currency, liberalizing somewhat the foreign trade
policy, and the liberalization of many prices. The new package of taxes and the reform of the system of
public finances represented the second step. The two remaining steps are privatization and the restruc-
turing of the companies themselves, as well as the recovery of the banking sector. The last two steps are
linked to the inflow of foreign capital in the form of credits or donations. The conclusion of the stand-by
arrangement with the IMF and the obtainment of a credit for structural adjustment from the World Bank
ensure the necessary, but still insufficient conditions for economic recovery. 
The package of laws pertaining to privatization is going into procedure in March, and the first effects
of its implementation are to be expected in the second half of the year. Several successful cases — "early
wins" — from the new law directed towards strategic investors may initiate a broader interest on the part
of foreign capital, and the expansion of this list is possible if the companies that launched ownership
transformation under the old law also seek strategic partners. Finally, a large number of companies will
have to undergo restructuring, which implies the resolution of the issue of debts, or the sale of certain
parts of the companies in an extremely poor position but possess potential profitability.
Foreign trade
Exports in March reached USD 188 million, marking 47% growth relative to the preceding month
(USD 128 mil.). Imports worth USD 366 million, which will rise to around USD 400 million following
correction. Monthly imports are unlikely to dip below this level for the remainder of the year.
The appreciation of the real hard currency rate continues. The seeming contradiction between the
reduced attractiveness of exports due to the appreciation of the real hard currency exchange rate and
the growth of exports is explained by the fact that the "reserves" that existed in the real exchange rate
from the period of the dinarÕs depreciation were extremely large, so that the effects of currency appre-
ciation are still not surfacing. Furthermore, the newly achieved preferential access to the European mar-
ket annuls part of the negative effects. Nevertheless, the dinarÕs further appreciation will quite certain-
ly have long-term negative effects on exports.
In the first quarter of the year, exports were directed towards Italy — USD 71 million, Germany USD
58 million and Switzerland USD 48 million. Compared to the previous year, countries of the former
Yugoslavia were less important as export partners.  Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina both ceded
their leading position of last year to the mentioned EU countries.
The largest share in exports since the beginning of the year was to Russia at USD 138 million,
Germany at USD 133 million, and Italy USD 90 million. A considerable increase was registered in trade
with countries of south east Europe, notably Romania at USD 62 million, Bulgaria USD 76 million, and
Hungary USD 52 million.
Money, Public Revenues and Expenditures 
At the end of March, the M1 money aggregate stood at 34.8 billion dinars, constituting a 10.6%
growth. In mid April, the money supply was 36.2 billion dinars. Deposit money was worth 24.8 billion
dinars and cash 11.4 billion. The M2 money aggregate was 42.3 billion dinars. The expansive monetary
policy continued in April as well, which also led
to the continuation of the remonetization process.
This process, which is closely linked to the adjust-
ment of prices, i.e. to the liberalization of prices
accompanied by fiscal policy, is for the moment
the reason why there is no overheating of aggre-
gate demand.
The market interest rate is still just above 5%
at the monthly level. Its lowering cannot be
expected before the second half of the year, when
part of the effects of the transferred inflation
wane. So far, the presence of certain foreign finan-
cial institution has not led to a major lowering of
interest rates on hard currency assets.
Hard currency reserves continue to grow, con-
tributing to the stability of the exchange rate, but
this too has its mentioned expenses, which are
still considerably lower than the positive effects of
the stable conditions for adjustment resulting from
the stability of the exchange rate and the depreci-
ation of the transferred inflation.
The gross collection of public revenues in
February was 19.8 billion dinars, which is 9.7% higher than the preceding month, when 18.1 billion
dinars were collected.
Talks with the IMF ended with the signing of a stand-by arrangement. Meanwhile the FRY has
become a full member of the World Bank. The IDA status has been obtained from the World Bank in
line with the expectations for achieving a favorable arrangement (Naples conditions) in regulating the
foreign debt.
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